What happened
On 13 August 2026 Judge Eumi K. Lee of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California ruled on a motion by Otter.ai, Inc. to dismiss a consolidated class action about its meeting assistant, the Otter Notetaker. The court dismissed some claims and ordered that "The motion is DENIED in all other respects."
The first complaint was filed on 15 August 2025. An order of 22 October 2025 consolidated three related cases into it, and the plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint on 5 December 2025. The plaintiffs are seven individuals from California, Illinois and Washington. Each alleges that they took part in a meeting in which the Notetaker was used and that they did not hold an Otter account (three plead this to their knowledge). They seek to represent a nationwide class and state subclasses.
A ruling on a motion to dismiss decides whether the plaintiffs have standing to sue and whether the complaint states a claim. The court generally "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party". Everything in this entry about Otter's conduct, other than what Otter's own documents and statements say, is the plaintiffs' allegation, and the order makes no finding that Otter acted unlawfully.
What the plaintiffs allege. When an accountholder connects a calendar, the complaint says, the Notetaker joins that person's Zoom, Google Meet and Microsoft Teams meetings, records and transcribes them in real time and sends the data to Otter's servers. It appears as the user's notetaker, for instance "Anna's Notetaker (Otter.ai)". The complaint alleges that the setting which sends other participants a notice before the meeting is off by default, and that the Notetaker usually posts no message, identifying itself in the chat only occasionally when someone asks. The order summarises the core allegation: the Notetaker joins meetings as a "silent participant" and records without the consent of all participants. The complaint, citing Otter's own announcement, says Otter has processed "over 1 billion meetings for 25 million global users".
The complaint's training allegation is the one the ruling turns on: "Otter has stated explicitly that it trains its AI models on recordings and transcriptions made using the Otter Notetaker." It alleges that "Otter does not seek the consent of meeting participants, besides the Otter accountholder, for using audio recordings or conversation transcriptions to train its ASR and machine learning models." ASR is automatic speech recognition. The complaint also alleges that the Notetaker creates a voiceprint for each speaker and that Otter "stores each voiceprint so that, in future meetings, Otter can identify the same individuals and transcribe their conversations."
Otter's privacy policy. The complaint relies on Otter's privacy policy. In the version captured by the Internet Archive on 28 November 2025, a week before the consolidated complaint, the policy was marked "Effective September 1, 2024". It said: "We train our proprietary artificial intelligence technology on de-identified audio recordings. We also train our technology on transcriptions to provide more accurate services, which may contain Personal Information." (The complaint's quotation of this passage omits the word "technology".) It asked a user who provides an audio recording to "make sure you have the necessary permissions from your co-workers, friends or other third parties before sharing Personal Information or referring them to us." The policy as it stood on 7 November 2026 is marked "Effective June 16, 2026". It lists among Otter's purposes "training our proprietary AI technology on de-identified audio recordings and on transcriptions (which may contain Personal Information)".
Otter's position. Otter argued, in the order's words, "that the Otter Notetaker joins meetings as an invited participant and functions as the meeting host's recording tool." In its answer of 17 September 2026, Otter "admits that the Otter Notetaker appears as a participant in meetings that it is allowed to join" in answer to paragraph 8 of the complaint, and denies the rest of that paragraph. It denies the allegation that the Notetaker is a tool used by Otter itself. To the training allegation in paragraph 69 of the complaint it responds that the publicly available materials "speak for themselves" and denies any allegation inconsistent with them. It gives the same response to the next two paragraphs, the first quoting its privacy policy and the second alleging that it does not seek the consent of participants other than the accountholder, and to each of those it adds a denial of the remaining allegations. One of its affirmative defences is that the claims are barred "to the extent the alleged conduct occurred with Plaintiffs' knowledge, authorization, consent, permission, or acquiescence." On 29 October 2026 Otter filed an amended answer. It was not in the public CourtListener archive on 7 November 2026. This entry describes the answer of 17 September only, and does not know whether the amended answer changes any of the responses or defences set out above. After the first complaint was filed, an Otter representative told Gizmodo: "Otter does not initiate recordings on its own. Recording only occurs when initiated by an Otter user, and our Terms of Service make clear that users are responsible for obtaining any necessary permissions before doing so". After the ruling, UC Today reported that a spokesperson "declined to comment on the ruling". Otter had published nothing about the order on its press page, or on the first page of its blog, that this register could find as at 7 November 2026.
The standing holding. The court first held that the plaintiffs had alleged a concrete injury, as Article III of the Constitution requires. It said that the injury alleged, "the unauthorized collection, use, and loss of control of highly sensitive personal information", "closely resembles the common-law privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion". It distinguished the Ninth Circuit's decision in Popa v. Microsoft (2025), which, as the order describes it, concerned the recording of "a user's interactions with a pet supply website", because the plaintiffs here allege the interception of private conversations on sensitive topics.
Since the order. The docket, as indexed by CourtListener on 7 November 2026, shows no amended complaint filed after the order, and Otter answered the consolidated complaint on 17 September. On 16 September the court amended the schedule. In that order the last day to move for class certification is 13 May 2027, the last day to hear that motion is 15 September 2027, and a trial-setting conference is fixed for 1 December 2027. The parties filed a stipulation and proposed order on 8 October and the court made an order on it on 9 October. In the docket text published by PacerMonitor, that stipulation is described as "Extending Time for Plaintiffs to Move to Strike and Defendant to Amend Its Answer as a Matter of Course". The parties filed a further stipulation on 22 October and the court made an order on it on 23 October. No public source this register could find describes those two documents. Otter filed an amended answer on 29 October. None of those five documents was in the public CourtListener archive on 7 November 2026. This entry relies on none of their contents, and cannot say whether the later orders changed the dates set on 16 September.
The duty engaged
This section sets out the order's reasoning and this register's reading of it, which is marked as such. The court's rulings were made on the pleadings and can be revisited on the evidence. The court did not decide the questions this register discusses beyond them, such as SB 690, a user's position or Article 28(10).
California's wiretap statute and the party rule. Section 631(a) of the California Penal Code, part of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), applies to anyone who "willfully and without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, reads, or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this state". It also reaches anyone who "uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in any way, any information so obtained", and anyone who "aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to unlawfully do, or permit, or cause to be done" those acts. The order states the governing distinction in the words of Graham v. Noom (2021): "if a person secretly listens to another's conversation, the person is liable." By contrast, "a party to a communication can record it (and is not eavesdropping when it does)."
Otter's argument was that the Notetaker records as the host's tool, so it stands in the host's position as a party. The court accepted that principle: "It is true that software providers acting only as an extension of a user or client are not considered third-party interceptors." In Graham, a website operator had used FullStory's session-recording software, and the court there held, on the allegations before it, that FullStory was "an extension of Noom" that provided "a tool . . . that allows Noom to record and analyze its own data," and so was not an eavesdropper. The Graham court later explained that FullStory "is not an outsider and instead is a software vendor that provides a service that allows Noom to analyze its own data".
The order then distinguished Graham on the allegations. "However, Plaintiffs allege that Otter does not solely act on behalf of users who choose to deploy the Otter Notetaker. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that Otter also retains their conversational data and uses it to improve its machine-learning models and services." Citing Yockey v. Salesforce (2024), the court said that "Software providers may qualify as third-party interceptors under these circumstances." The court concluded: "Because Plaintiffs plausibly allege that Otter independently collects, retains, and uses communications for its own commercial purposes, they have sufficiently alleged that Otter is a third-party eavesdropper under section 631."
Yockey concerned Salesforce's customer-service chat software. The court there first dismissed the section 631 claim because the allegations did not support an inference that Salesforce had "the capability to use these communications for any purpose other than furnishing them to Kaiser", one of the websites using it. The claim went forward once the plaintiffs alleged that chat communications were used to "train the AI models that form the basis of some of its services." Graham noted that the plaintiffs had not alleged that FullStory used the data itself, while Yockey, applying Javier v. Assurance IQ (N.D. Cal. 2023), asked whether the vendor "ha[s] the capability to use its record of the interaction for any other purpose." (Salesforce conceded that the amended allegations met that test.) The Otter order rests on alleged actual use. On this register's reading it did not need to decide whether a capability to use the content, without more, would be enough. A federal court in Massachusetts said on 30 September 2026 that "Courts are divided on that issue", noting (in an earlier court's words) "a growing number of district courts" adopting the capability test (M.C. v. Curriculum Associates, D. Mass. No. 1:25-cv-13942).
Confidential communications and the remedy. Section 632 applies to a person who, "intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential communication, uses an electronic amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop upon or record the confidential communication". A confidential communication is one "carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto". The definition excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in a proceeding open to the public, "or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded." The court held that one California plaintiff, who alleges a call with a medical professional, plausibly alleged a confidential communication, and that the other two did not. The CIPA count survives in full on section 631. Section 637.2 gives a person injured by a violation an action for "the greater of" $5,000 per violation or three times actual damages, and provides that it is not "a necessary prerequisite to an action pursuant to this section that the plaintiff has suffered, or be threatened with, actual damages." The complaint seeks that remedy for the California subclass. On 30 September 2026 the Governor approved Senate Bill 690 (Stats. 2026, Ch. 976), which amends section 637.2 with effect from 1 January 2027. Its new limit concerns an action against a private actor for a violation of section 638.51, the provision on pen registers and trap and trace devices, "alleged to arise from conduct occurring on an internet website, online application, or mobile application". Such an action may be brought under section 637.2 "only by the Attorney General". The bill applies its amendments to any pending claim in an action commenced within two years before its operative date. On this register's reading that date is 1 January 2027, when the bill takes effect under the California Constitution, because the bill sets no other. They do not change claims under sections 631 and 632, however, and the plaintiffs had already withdrawn their section 638.51 claim.
The federal Wiretap Act. The federal statute permits interception "where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State" (18 U.S.C. section 2511(2)(d)). The order quotes an earlier decision: "The consent of one party is a complete defense to [an ECPA] claim."
The plaintiffs argued that "even if Otter could be considered a 'party' to their conversations", the exception for a criminal or tortious purpose applies, because, relying on Brown v. Google (2021), a "primary motivation or a determining factor" in Otter's conduct "has been to injure plaintiffs tortiously." They allege that Otter used their conversations without consent to train its "machine learning systems for its own pecuniary gain." Otter responded that any interception was undertaken only for "commercial purposes". The court quoted Riganian v. LiveRamp (2025): "committing a tort and seeking a profit are not mutually exclusive". It denied the motion without deciding whether Otter was a party or saying in terms whether that test was met. Riganian records that courts have differed on whether a profit motive can be a tortious purpose. Earlier decisions, following In re DoubleClick (S.D.N.Y. 2001), had treated a purpose to make money as not tortious. Riganian declined to follow them, saying the court "is not persuaded that commercially exploiting unlawfully obtained information is 'licit' merely because it is profitable".
On this register's reading, the federal claim, like the California one, depends on the vendor's alleged use of the content. The Ninth Circuit asks about the purpose of the interception: "the focus is not upon whether the interception itself violated another law; it is upon whether the purpose for the interception" (its "intended use") was criminal or tortious (Sussman v. American Broadcasting Cos., 186 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1999), quoting Payne v. Norwest Corp., 911 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (D. Mont. 1995)). The prior consent of the user who brings in the notetaker would ordinarily be a defence. The plaintiffs rely on the alleged purpose of the training use to overcome it. If the claim succeeds, section 2520(c)(2) lets the court assess either actual damages and any profits the violator made as a result of the violation or, if greater, statutory damages of "whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000".
The dismissed claims, and the link to agent access. The court dismissed the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) claim, with leave to amend. It held that the allegation that Otter accessed the plaintiffs' computers was conclusory, and that the losses pleaded are not losses the statute recognises. In a footnote it referred to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Amazon v Perplexity (AIR-2026-010), which treated the user who directs an AI agent as the person who accesses a website. The court said it had not relied on that decision, but observed that it "casts doubt on whether Plaintiffs can state a CFAA claim based on their current theory that Otter accesses Plaintiffs' computers indirectly through the acts of Otter users who deploy the Notetaker." California's computer crime claim was also dismissed, for want of a recognised loss. The claims under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, which concern the voiceprints, survive, as do the unfair competition and unjust enrichment claims and one plaintiff's claims for intrusion upon seclusion and under the California Constitution.
For UK readers. The order applies United States law only. The question it turns on, whether a vendor that uses meeting content for its own purposes is still acting only for its customer, has a counterpart in UK data protection law. Article 28(10) of the UK GDPR provides: "Without prejudice to Articles 82, 83 and 84, if a processor infringes this Regulation by determining the purposes and means of processing, the processor shall be considered to be a controller in respect of that processing." Otter's privacy policy, as it stood on 7 November 2026, describes both roles. Where it has "an Otter Business or enterprise service agreement" with an enterprise customer, it says it processes personal information "on behalf of and at the instructions of that customer" and that "such enterprise customers are the data controllers". Otherwise it says that "we are the data controller under the applicable privacy laws". On this register's reading, a contract that describes a notetaker vendor as a processor does not settle the vendor's position for processing whose purposes it decides for itself, such as training its own models.
The liability chain
The register tags this vendor. The tag records where the claim, and the reasoning that let it proceed, place responsibility, and is not a finding.
The vendor. Otter is the only defendant. The order's section 631 holding attaches to Otter because of what Otter is alleged to do with the content once it has it: keep it and use it to improve its models. The same alleged use is the basis of the plaintiffs' answer to the federal party exception. On the reasoning in Graham, a vendor that records for its customer and does nothing else with the content is an extension of that customer and outside section 631, although courts that apply the capability test also ask what such a vendor is able to do with the content. The plaintiffs also plead that Otter's default settings and the way the Notetaker appears in meetings left other participants without notice, which goes to consent.
The user who brings the notetaker into the meeting. No user is a party on the docket as at 7 November 2026, and the order does not address users' liability. On this register's reading the user's position under California law is open on the statutes' own terms.
A party may record its own conversation under section 631, so a user whose tool is only its extension is not an eavesdropper. That is the position the plaintiffs say Otter loses through its own use of the content. Section 631 also reaches anyone who "aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with" an eavesdropper. In Revitch v. New Moosejaw (N.D. Cal. 2019), deciding a motion to dismiss, the court said that a website operator "cannot be liable for eavesdropping on its own communications". It held that the complaint "adequately alleges that Moosejaw violated section 631 by enabling NaviStone's wrongdoing" (NaviStone was the marketing company whose code, according to the complaint in that case, Moosejaw had embedded in its website). It relied on Ribas v. Clark (1985), where the California Supreme Court said, quoting a law review comment, that section 631 was designed to "protect a person placing or receiving a call from a situation where the person on the other end of the line permits an outsider to tap his telephone or listen in on the call". The Moosejaw order also noted a contrary decision, Powell v. Union Pacific Railroad (E.D. Cal. 2012). If a notetaker vendor is a third-party eavesdropper, a customer that engaged it could face a claim of that kind, although the authority is divided. Such a claim would also turn on what the customer knew. The federal court in Massachusetts that decided M.C. v. Curriculum Associates said on 30 September 2026 that an aiding claim "must first plausibly allege that the third party violated one of the first three 'operative' clauses", and that the statutory language "implicitly requires 'both knowledge of the conduct that will violate the statute and a purpose of aiding, agreeing with, or employing the third party to commit those acts.'" (quoting Smith v. YETI Coolers (N.D. Cal. 2024)). It also noted that "Some courts have read the fourth clause to impose a less stringent scienter requirement."
Section 632's definition of "person" "excludes an individual known by all parties to a confidential communication to be overhearing or recording the communication." The California Supreme Court has said that section 632 applies to a participant who records. It "simply prohibits such a party from secretly or surreptitiously recording the conversation, that is, from recording the conversation without first informing all parties to the conversation that the conversation is being recorded" (Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney (2006) 39 Cal.4th 95, 118).
The order's treatment of the Washington claim bears on notice. Applying Washington's rule that a party who knows a communication will be recorded is deemed to consent, the court said at the pleading stage that "Even if the Otter Notetaker appeared in the meeting as another participant, the Court cannot infer that [the Washington plaintiff] knew his communications were being recorded, transcribed, and retained by Otter." (That claim was dismissed on a different ground.) Otter's privacy policy and its 2025 statement both place the task of obtaining permissions on the user. The complaint alleges that "Otter subscribers have no authority to waive the privacy rights of other meeting participants". Section 631 requires the consent of all parties where the one listening in is a third party, which is what the plaintiffs say Otter is, and section 632 requires it for recording a confidential communication, even by a party. On those terms the consent of the person who invites the notetaker does not by itself answer for everyone else in the meeting.
The comparison with Amazon v Perplexity. The two rulings concern different statutes. Under the CFAA, the Ninth Circuit, in a preliminary-injunction ruling, attributed an agent's access to the user who directs it, and the Otter footnote observes that this casts doubt on the plaintiffs' computer-access theory. Under section 631, as this order reads it, a vendor shares its user's position while it acts only for that user, and its own use of the content can take it out of that position.
What remains open. The merits, including whether Otter uses meeting content as alleged and what its de-identification involves; the standing and consent defences pleaded in Otter's answer of 17 September, and any change to them in its amended answer, which this register has not seen; whether a class can be certified; and whether the plaintiffs seek leave to replead the dismissed claims. The court said the plaintiffs "are encouraged to consider whether to reassert the dismissed claims, given that many others are proceeding."
What would have prevented it
These points follow the conduct the complaint alleges. They assume, without deciding, that the allegations are accurate.
- Keep the customer's service apart from the vendor's own use. On the order's reasoning, a notetaker vendor's use of meeting content to train its own models is what may make it a third party to the conversation. A vendor that trains on meeting content can reduce this exposure by obtaining consent from every participant whose words are used, or by excluding from training the content of participants who are not users. Courts that apply the capability test may look at what the vendor is able to do with the content, not only at what it does.
- Tell every participant, at the start. The complaint alleges that pre-meeting notice to other participants is off by default and that the Notetaker identifies itself only occasionally, when asked. Notice that reaches participants who are not users, before recording begins, goes to the consent question in all-party consent states and, under section 632, to whether a meeting is confidential at all.
- For organisations that deploy notetakers, ask the vendor about training before admitting it to meetings. Confirm in the contract whether meeting content is used to train the vendor's models, whether an enterprise agreement limits the vendor to acting on the organisation's instructions, and how voiceprints are retained and deleted.
- Treat confidential meetings separately. The order let the section 632 and intrusion claims proceed only for the plaintiff who alleged a call with a medical professional, because that allegation showed what the conversation contained. An organisation can keep notetakers out of meetings of that kind unless every participant agrees.
Mapped controls
- OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026: no ASI category is asserted. The ruling concerns statutory interpretation on the pleadings, and the ASI categories classify security failure modes of agents.
- NIST AI RMF: a GOVERN question, namely whether the vendor has a policy, and accountability, for using customer and third-party content to train its models. A MAP question, namely whether the people affected by the system include meeting participants who never agreed to the vendor's terms, and in which jurisdictions all-party consent applies.
- California law: Penal Code sections 631, 632 and 637.2 (the last as amended by Stats. 2026, Ch. 976 from 1 January 2027, which does not change claims under sections 631 and 632).
- Federal law: 18 U.S.C. sections 2511(2)(d) (the party exception and its criminal or tortious purpose limit) and 2520 (civil remedy).
- UK GDPR: Article 28(10), a processor that infringes the Regulation by determining the purposes and means of processing is a controller in respect of that processing.
- EU AI Act: not addressed by the order and not analysed here.
Sources
- In re Otter.ai Privacy Litigation, No. 5:25-cv-06911-EKL, Order Granting Motion to Dismiss in Part (ECF 68) - N.D. Cal., 13 August 2026, Judge Eumi K. Lee, 23 pages, read in full. Copy from the CourtListener RECAP archive. Primary for the holdings, the reasoning and the court's quotations of other authorities - checked 16 October 2026 [primary]
- Consolidated Class Action Complaint (ECF 35) - filed 5 December 2025, 68 pages, read for the factual allegations, the CIPA and Wiretap Act counts and the relief sought - checked 16 October 2026 [primary]
- Otter.ai's Answer to Plaintiffs' Consolidated Class Action Complaint (ECF 80) - filed 17 September 2026, 91 pages. Primary for Otter's admissions, denials and affirmative defences in that answer. Otter's amended answer of 29 October 2026 (ECF 85) was not in the public archive on 7 November 2026 - checked 16 October 2026 [primary]
- Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order (ECF 79) - 16 September 2026 - checked 16 October 2026 [primary]
- Docket, In re Otter.AI Privacy Litigation - read through the CourtListener search API and its docket-entry records. Primary for the filing dates, the consolidation order of 22 October 2025 and the entries of 8, 9, 22, 23 and 29 October 2026 - checked 7 November 2026 [primary]
- PacerMonitor, docket for In re OtterAI Privacy Litigation - source for the docket text of the stipulation of 8 October 2026 and the order of 9 October 2026 - checked 7 November 2026 [secondary]
- Graham v. Noom, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-06903-LB, order of 8 April 2021 (ECF 51) and order of 13 August 2021 (ECF 79) - N.D. Cal. The first is reported at 533 F. Supp. 3d 823 - checked 16 October 2026 [primary]
- Yockey v. Salesforce, Inc., No. 4:22-cv-09067-JST, Order Denying Motion to Dismiss (ECF 69) - N.D. Cal., 16 August 2024, reported at 745 F. Supp. 3d 945. Judgment was entered in that case on 15 October 2026. An amended notice of appeal filed that day identifies Ninth Circuit case No. 26-6205 - checked 7 November 2026 [primary]
- Riganian v. LiveRamp Holdings, Inc., No. 4:25-cv-00824-JST, order of 18 July 2025 (ECF 60) and Brown v. Google LLC, No. 4:20-cv-03664-LHK, order of 12 March 2021 (ECF 113) - N.D. Cal., the two authorities the order cites on the criminal or tortious purpose exception - checked 16 October 2026 [primary]
- Revitch v. New Moosejaw, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-06827-VC, order of 23 October 2019 (ECF 64) - N.D. Cal., from the CourtListener RECAP archive - checked 16 October 2026 [primary]
- Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355 and Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 95 - California Supreme Court, Caselaw Access Project text with official page numbers - checked 16 October 2026 [primary]
- Sussman v. American Broadcasting Cos., 186 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1999) - Caselaw Access Project text with official page numbers - checked 16 October 2026 [primary]
- M.C. v. Curriculum Associates, LLC, D. Mass. No. 1:25-cv-13942, order of 30 September 2026 (ECF 49) - from the CourtListener RECAP archive - checked 7 November 2026 [primary]
- California Constitution, article IV, section 8 - for the date on which a statute enacted at a regular session takes effect - checked 7 November 2026 [primary]
- California Penal Code, sections 631, 632 and 637.2 - checked 7 November 2026 [primary]
- Senate Bill 690 (2025-26), chaptered text and bill history - approved 30 September 2026, Stats. 2026, Ch. 976 - checked 7 November 2026 [primary]
- 18 U.S.C. sections 2511 and 2520 - United States Code, 2023 edition, via govinfo (the text quoted is the same in the 2024 edition) - checked 7 November 2026 [primary]
- UK GDPR, Article 28 - legislation.gov.uk, latest available revised version - checked 7 November 2026 [primary]
- Otter.ai, Privacy Policy: as captured by the Internet Archive on 28 November 2025 (marked effective 1 September 2024, the same date as the capture of 10 August 2025) and as published on 16 October 2026 (marked effective 16 June 2026; the text quoted was unchanged on 7 November 2026) - checked 7 November 2026 [primary]
- Otter.ai, press page and blog index - searched for any statement on the order - checked 7 November 2026 [primary]
- This register, AIR-2026-010 - Amazon v Perplexity
- Gizmodo, "Otter.ai Sued for Allegedly Recording Work Calls Without Consent" - 18 August 2025. Source for Otter's emailed statement on the first complaint - checked 7 November 2026 [secondary]
- UC Today, "Otter.ai Fails to Dismiss Core Privacy Claims in U.S. Court" - 18 August 2026. Source for the spokesperson declining to comment on the ruling - checked 7 November 2026 [secondary]